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QUESTIONING A NEOLIBERAL URBAN REGENERATION POLICY:
THE RHETORIC OF “CITIES OF CULTURE” AND THE CITY OF GWANGJU, KOREA
By Kwang-Suk Lee
Abstract
The present study traces recent trends in cultural policy concerning “cities of culture” in
South Korea. The paper is a case study of the city of Gwangju, known as the birthplace of
modern democracy in Korea. Currently, public input from below into the urban
regeneration project for Gwangju is almost nonexistent, while most urban regeneration
policies have been implemented from the top by elites who enjoy exhibiting their
performances through constructing massive edifices rather than encouraging the
preservation of such intangibles as historical significance through cultural participation
from below. The government’s policy of promoting Gwangju as the “city of culture” in
order to make it a hub of Asian cultural industry and tourism in the global economy is
closely allied to its policy of economic reductionism of culture. The study suggests that
Gwangju and its unique heritage would instead benefit from an urban regeneration policy
aimed at establishing it as the city of art and culture for human rights and democracy and
as part of a collaborative network with the heritage initiatives of international bodies.
KEYWORDS neoliberalism; state interventionism; creative city; cultural industry; sustainable
development; human rights
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Introduction
The urban renewal programs in South Korea under the military regimes that ruled the
country from the 1960s to the early 1990s were based entirely on economic development policies
promoting heavy industry and new construction. Thanks to such interventionist, governmentdriven policies in urban development, since the launching of the civilian government in the mid1990s, South Korea, and especially the city of Seoul—East Asia’s second-largest metropolitan
area—has been transformed into an intermediary nodal point or hub for disseminating the global
ideas of neoliberal urban development within the developing Asian countries.
The present study surveys the neoliberal paradigm of economic expansion that has
dominated policy discourses related to urban development and traces recent cultural policy
concerning “cities of culture” in South Korea. Since 2004, the Korean government and its
Ministry of Culture and Tourism have implemented a cultural policy of renovating several midsized cities such as Gwangju, Kyongju, and Jeonju as “international cultural cities.” This policy
of designating Korea’s larger cities as niches of Asian cultural industry and tourism in the global
economy is closely related to the government’s economic reductionism of culture. Heedless of
the cultural diversity, social conditions, and local traditions in a given city, the government has
aimed at gaining market share by transforming traditional culture into profitable show business
ventures. The present paper is a case study of the city of Gwangju, which is known as the
“birthplace of democracy” in Korea because of the massacre of striking workers, protesting
students, and citizens that occurred there on May 18, 1980. The present study investigates how
the historic city of Gwangju, once a democratic “commune” of local citizens resisting the
military regime of the 80s, has lost its spirit, and how the Korean government has redesigned a
city in an attempt to make it a powerhouse in the global economy.
Currently, the dominant market power of supranational economic institutions has entirely
subordinated Korean IT and cultural policies to the global economic order. The effect of the
uncritical appropriation of neoliberal discourses about globalization in urban renewal policies
has been to replace local geographical, cultural, social, and environmental conditions in a city
with a geometrical grid of economic reductionism. Instead of improving urban life, the rhetoric
of development usually leads to gentrification, commercialization, and the reduction of the
cultural and the local to the economic (McGuigan 2004, p. 98). When the rapid privatization and
commercialization of cultural landscapes and resources is the collaborative work of proprietary
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desire and government support, the role of the government in building the public commons for
citizens is suspect. The incorporation of Korean IT and cultural policies into a new imperial
mode of production—the so-called “knowledge-based economic system”—is an abdication of
the normative role of the state as a public mediator guaranteeing the cultural rights of the citizen
and defending citizens’ common intellectual heritage against overly narrow marketism.
The present study first examines the current neoliberal logic of economic reductionism of
culture and how local cities in the process of neoliberal urbanization have been entirely
subordinated to policy discourses of the cultural or creative industry. The study then looks at the
historical value of Gwangju for Korea and East Asia and at the cultural policies driven by
entrepreneurial urban management which have been implemented for Gwangju. The study next
explores how the current Korean policy drive to create “cities of culture” is being catalyzed by
market initiatives. Finally, this study recommends that if the government wants to address the
historic pain of an oppressed region, it should embark on a different urban project, both by
designating Gwangju as an international sanctum of human rights resistance to authoritarian
regimes and by connecting with the cultural initiatives of international bodies such as the United
Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), which could situate
Gwangju’s unique human rights heritage within one of its cultural heritage projects.
Neoliberal Urbanization of Local Cities
Cities have always included spatial vocabularies of power: there is an uneven geography
of segregations, disparities, and exclusions between downtown and ghettos or slums, between
urban and rural, between local and global, between center and periphery, and so on. For instance,
“fortified” or “carceral” cities (Davis 1990; Soja 1996) are terms reflecting a new stage of
deregulatory social control, one that involves policing urban space through pervasive and
ubiquitous mobility. The “dual city” (Castells 1999), the “de-industrialized city” (Lash & Urry
1994, pp. 151–153), and the “polarized city” (Short 2004) are all terms depicting the uneven
development of cities within the networks of global economies. Either local and regional cities
are subordinated to serve as intermediaries transfusing their material and immaterial assets into
major global cities, or they are excluded and disconnected from the “control points for the
reproduction of capitalist society in terms of labor power, exchange, and consumption patterns”
(Soja 1989, p. 95).
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From the early 1980s onwards, a huge trend in the global age of neoliberalism has been a
new entrepreneurial urbanization in particular localized settings. Neoliberalism goes beyond the
classical claims of the laissez-faire market operated by the “invisible hand” and represents
instead a pervasive drive to reconfigure society entirely by national and international business
powers. In the neoliberal phase of capitalism, the scope of market commodities is extended to the
private appropriation of tangible or intangible cultural forms and intellectual creativity as new
profit sources for capitalism and to the legitimating of this process through the legal system that
defends intellectual property rights such as copyright, trademark, and patent. Once disregarded
as a profit source, the material and immaterial cultural assets of local cities are increasingly seen
as key resources for creating the new productive value chain of the cultural industry. Local cities
have gradually become “strategically crucial arenas for neoliberal forms of policy
experimentation and institutional restructuring” (Brenner & Theodore 2002, p. 357). The spatial
reconfiguration weaving together the global–local nexus within specific regional and local places
implies the major trends of urban entrepreneurialism: that of the “creative city” projects, which
are directed toward exploiting cultural resources for local economic development, and that of the
“techno-city” projects, which aim to create ideal future cities incorporating digital technology
and communication networks in leading advanced IT countries.
These high-tech and market-driven models of urban renewal reflect the changing mode of
profitable resources in capitalism, which is creating a new value productive chain from the
privatization of cultural assets in local and regional cities. Harvey (2005, pp. 101–108) describes
some of the political and territorial logics of neoliberalism, such as capturing local and
regional dynamics as a source of capitalist power and augmenting that power by setting up
havens for capital investment such as constructing new high-tech industrial districts, designating
special districts for tourism, and granting privileged loans for real estate speculation in local
economies. Moreover, as shown in a study of thirteen large-scale urban development projects in
European Union countries (Swyngedouw et al. 2002), the policy processes of urban development
in targeted cities are characterized by “less democratic and more elite-driven priorities” (p. 542).
The new urban renewal projects are “the material expression of a developmental logic that views
megaprojects and place-marketing as means for generating future growth and for waging a
competitive struggle to attract investment capital” (p. 546).
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The “creative city” discourse has also made its way to the center of cultural policy
debates, as well as of urban renewal policy issues. Landry (2000, p. xii) describes the “creative
city” as a new “method of strategic urban planning” by reinventing the city as a “vibrant hub of
creativity, potential and improving quality of life.” Florida (2002, pp. 244–266) emphasizes a
“creativity index” used for the purpose of reviving regional growth that includes a hightechnology indicator and a cultural resource indicator which mainly consists of a diversity index
measuring such factors as the proportion of gay population, bohemian culture, and nontraditional
lifestyle found in a specific region.
This idealistic appeal to the innovative and creative index of cities, however, ignores how
such rhetoric is co-opted by market-driven policies that lead to spatial disparity and segregation
of populations by social class which degrade the urban landscape. The new policy discourses of
entrepreneurial urban management ignore such realistic aspects of cities as wage slavery, high
unemployment, and alienated urban ghettos — the desolate conditions of urban life vividly
depicted as the “unreal city” in T. S. Eliot’s The Waste Land (1922). The “creative city”
approach presents a “sanitized” picture of urban life, passing over such realities of city life as the
stark inequalities between urban dwellers, the dwarfing of local cultural resources by large-scale
corporate ownership, and the elite-led processes through which such cultural policies are made
(Chatterson 2000).
Gwangju, one of Korea’s local cities, is an example of such neoliberal urban regeneration
policies. Gwangju was once known as “a center of revolution against the established order”
(Harvey 1973, p. 203); the neoliberal shift in cultural policy to economic reductionism, by
establishing Gwangju’s topological status as a semi-peripheral hub for promoting and connecting
global and Asian trade and cultural industry, has transformed it instead into “a center of power
and privilege (to be revolted against)” (p. 204). Neoliberal urban policy in Gwangju thus has
rapidly subverted insurgency and cultural diversity, stripped the natural environment from the
local urban landscape, and commodified the local tangible and intangible heritage. In their place
it has brought economic exploitation, cultural decay, the impoverishment of urban ghettos,
increased traffic congestion, and the destruction of local urban ecologies by out-of-town
developers. A city that was once a symbol of local pro-democratic political insurgency has been
co-opted by neoliberal urban and cultural policies such as creating new incentive structures to
reward local entrepreneurialism, constructing large-scale urban projects to attract corporate
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investment, and repositioning the city within supranational capital flows, while excluding the
underprivileged from the processes of cultural policy-making.
In sum, the new entrepreneurial approach to cultural policy is pervasive in large-scale
urban regeneration projects of for local cities throughout the world, and this approach effaces
local cultural heritage and historical memory in the name of local economic development. The
Korean government’s cultural policy has embraced the neoliberal economic reductionism of
culture, to the diminution of Gwangju’s significance as a shrine to human rights.
The Economic Reductionism of Korea’s Urban Regeneration
Although cultural policy is a kind of “balancing act” between competing visions of the
role of culture in society (e.g., Matarasso & Landry 1999), the Korean government has taken a
major role in the neoliberal rearrangement of urban spaces and Korean cultural policy is largely
market-driven. The spatial redesign of the modern Korean city has been entirely conditioned by
the strong alliance between state interventionism and neoliberal economic reductionism, along
with a conscious desire to be brought under the umbrella of the globalized economy of cultural
industry. Harvey (2003) describes how the active role of the state releases a set of public assets
through deregulation, privatization, financial liberalization, and the commercialization of cultural
and historical assets that were once in the public domain. To optimize conditions for capital
accumulation, a market-friendly public policy is essential to the neoliberal state system, and this
consequently causes cutbacks in welfare provision, healthcare, public education, and core social
services, while at the same time providing market incentives in the form of tax breaks, the
creation of infrastructure at state expense, and the opening of local markets known as “structural
adjustment” to global forces (Harvey 2006, pp. 23–26). The state-driven urban development
policies of East and Southeast Asia, such as those of Singapore, Taiwan, and Korea, are
examples of state interventionism and the economic growth it can create. In Korea, the spatial
appropriation by capital and the state is currently being vitalized by a new state-generated
rhetoric directed at persuading citizens to legitimize it by cooperating with a “cities of culture”
policy project, a version of “creative city” projects elsewhere.
In Korea, since 1973 when the military regime established the first master plan for
cultural development, the title of the Ministry of Culture and Tourism has changed several times,
responding to the policy focus of each administration: the Ministry of Culture and Information
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(1973–89), the Ministry of Culture (1990–92), the Ministry of Culture and Sports (1993–97), and
finally, the Ministry of Culture and Tourism (1998–the present). The concept of “cultural
welfare” which the government had officially supported since the 1970s was rapidly transformed
under the civilian regimes of the 1990s into the neoliberal policy agenda of promoting the
domestic cultural industry and tourism, especially since 1998 when Dae-jung Kim, once a
prominent political activist, became president. The IMF-driven financial crisis of 1997 in Korea
meant that the Kim administration which took office in 1998 inherited the heavy political burden
of attempting to restructure the domestic market so as to allow it to become vulnerable to the
pressure of global conglomerates. While Kim had advocated a democratic reform of the old
authoritarian regime, under the conditions of increasing globalization his policy shifted to the
radical adoption of neoliberal economic policies and to promoting the information and culture
industries over the labor-intensive heavy industries. Because of Kim’s success in enacting
political reform, opposition to his administration’s economic drive toward privatization and
commercialization was muted (Cho 2000, p. 422). Since that time, culture has been widely
regarded both as a key dimension of economic globalization and as a creative industry for
earning foreign dollars and creating a new job market.
Throughout the administration of Dae-jung Kim and that of the current president, Moohyun Noh, policy plans for the cultural or creative industry have been so driven by economic
reductionism of culture that voices advocating cultural diversity have been drowned out by a
vague rhetoric of “international competition” (Amin 1998, p. 46). Bourdieu’s (2003) critique of
“the policy of depoliticization” is quite apt for describing current cultural policy in Korea.
Bourdieu pinpoints exactly the destructive aspect of the emergent neoliberal policy, which aims
to “grant economic determinisms a fatal stranglehold by ‘liberating’ them from all controls, and
to obtain the submission of citizens and governments to the economic” (p. 38).
Since the establishment of a Committee for Planning the Cities of Culture by presidential
order (No. 18279) in February 2004, Korea’s major cities, such as Gwangju, Busan, Incheon,
Kyongju, and Jeonju, have been strategically designated “cities of culture” in order to promote
the creative industries in response to global market demands. Kyongju (designated the “city of
history”) and Jeonju (the “city of tradition”) are being promoted for tourism as having an ancient
historical tradition and cultural heritage, while larger cities such as Gwangju (the “city of
culture”), Incheon (the “city of entertainment”), and Busan (the “city of visual media”) have
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been designated as “creative cities”; all these cities have been placed under the direct supervision
of the national government and its Ministry of Culture and Tourism. The concept of “creative
cities” means adjusting local urban spaces to make them function within a global framework
(e.g., Tay 2005), and the Korean “cities of culture” are versions of the “creative cities” that
cultural policy theorists and urban geographers have described as being created through the
cultural globalization promoted by local and central government policy initiatives. The Korean
government’s “city of culture” project in Gwangju, however, involves more state intervention
than is used in other Korean cities. Before investigating why the current Noh government is so
deeply involved in the urban policy of Gwangju, this study gives an overview of the democratic
history of Gwangju and the living conditions of its citizens.
The Unique Role of Gwangju in Korean History
Located in Cholla Province, Gwangju, which means “village of light,” is the hub of the
southwestern (Honam) region of the Korean Peninsula and is a first-tier metropolitan city with a
population of about 1.41 million (Korean Bureau of National Statistics 2005). From ancient
times, the Honam region has been known for its fertile plains. Ironically, the optimal conditions
for agriculture enabled feudal landlords to squeeze labor out of the peasant farmers in a
miserable way for three centuries during the Chosun dynasty. Despite the people’s impoverished
economic and social life, the region has been important in the development of art (Gwangju is
the birthplace of namjonghwa, the southern school of Chinese painting) and music (Gwangju is a
center of seopyungae, a form of pansori, the traditional Korean epic music-drama). The
popularity of art and music in Gwangju suggests that it served as a cultural catharsis in the midst
of so much exploitation by feudal overlords.
While the miserable conditions of the people’s life may have stimulated their artistic and
cultural sensibilities, Gwangju’s citizens also have a long historical tradition of defending
themselves against landlords who made the farmers suffer in abject poverty (it was the center of
the 1894 Donghak rebellion) and against the Japanese colonial occupation (it was the location of
the 1929 student revolt). Most importantly, the uprising of Gwangju’s citizens in May 1980 is
remembered as marking a new era of democracy in modern Korean history. It is ironic, therefore,
to see the historical memory of democracy and human rights be diminished by a top-down
cultural policy decision of the national government.
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In South Korea up through at least the early 1990s, the grid of military-authoritarian
practices that threatened citizens’ public rights was pervasive: for instance, the national ID
system identifying each Korean, the use of paramilitary violence to break labor unions, the use of
closed-circuit TV’s for policing, and the widespread practice of government eavesdropping and
of politically-motivated investigations of activist citizens. During the 1970s and 1980s, the
regime in power employed a wide variety of means to compel most citizens to become docile
subjects—imposing a curfew, forcibly shearing the hair of “hippies,” torturing political activists,
searching citizens’ possessions on the street, silencing the voice of leftists in the public arena,
and so forth. During the dark period of rule by military regimes, Korean citizens were eager to
have more political rights such as freedom of speech, expression, and assembly, but these were
repeatedly denied.
The times were turbulent: in 1979, South Korea’s first military dictator, Cheong-hee
Park, was assassinated, and on December 12 of that year General Doo-hwan Chun came to
power in a military coup. Chun declared nationwide martial law, which was directed at banning
all political activity, crushing the labor movement, closing the universities, and arresting prodemocracy politicians and activists, including Dae-jung Kim (Shelley 2001). These actions
sparked an uprising in Gwangju on May 18, 1980. For the five days of the uprising, the citizens
of Gwangju held the city: over 200,000 people participated in demonstrations and hundreds of
civilians in the provincial capitol building (which served as the headquarters for the citizens’
army) took up arms against the military regime. During this period, when Gwangju was
completely blockaded by the military siege and cut off from contact with the outside world, a
Citizens’ Council was spontaneously organized to defend the city, maintain public security,
distribute food and water, and prepared to offer armed resistance to the military. On May 22,
1980, however, the military regime brutally quelled the uprising, massacring as many as 2,000
people—striking workers, protesting students, and citizens—and took control of Gwangju.1
Chun then used the demonstrations in Gwangju as a pretext for furthering his repressive policies.
The Memory of the Gwangju Massacre as an Unhealed Wound
The Gwangju uprising is seen as the most tragic event in the history of modern Korea.
Gwangju is viewed as a shrine of democracy where Koreans remember both the painful history
of violent repression by the military regime and the first, brief instance of a functioning
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democracy in Korea. Ironically, since 1993, when Young-sam Kim became Korea’s first
democratically-elected civilian president, Korean presidents have regarded Gwangju as a
nuisance. Young-sam Kim made some superficial gestures to memorialize the dead: the
establishment of a 5/18 Foundation in 1994, a new memorial 5/18 Mangwol-dong Cemetery
(1997) and other memorial sites, and the Gwangju Uprising Act (1997), which offered some
compensation to the families of those massacred. Rather than promoting national unity as the
government intended, however, state-sponsored projects in Gwangju instead revealed the deep
divisions that remain between Gwangju and the central government. For instance, Yea’s (2002)
field study of the 5/18 Cemetery demonstrated how the state-sponsored “memorial industry” —
which arbitrarily relocated the old Mangwol-dong Cemetery and converted the old sites of a
torture chamber and of a military court into a “5/18 Memorial Park” and a “Remembrance Park”
— resulted in covering over, rather than healing, the memories that the old sites had preserved. It
is quite natural that these arbitrary state projects have little historical meaning for the citizens of
Gwangju.
Unlike Young-sam Kim’s clever attempt at political resolution by memorializing the
uprising, Moo-hyun Noh, during his campaign for the presidency, announced a plan to promote
Gwangju as “the capital of Asian culture.” Since Noh’s election in April 2003, the government’s
cultural policies for Gwangju have been repackaged as part of a new urban regeneration project
with several aims: integrating the local into the global economy; promoting the local economy,
which has been lagging behind the rest of the country, by means of urban tourism and city
marketing; and sanitizing the painful past of the city. Noh’s administration began to actively
implement the Gwangju project through a series of policy initiatives: first there was field
research to establish Gwangju as the “city of culture” (June through August 2003), followed by
an official briefing, with President Noh in attendance, announcing Gwangju as “the Cultural
Capital of Asia” (November 2003), the establishment of a Committee for Planning the City of
Culture (March 2004), the announcement of open bidding for research projects to regenerate
Gwangju as Asia’s cultural capital (August 2004), and the official invitation of Gwangju’s
citizens and artists to a policy briefing about regenerating Gwangju as the cultural capital
(November 2004).
A series of neoliberal interventionist cultural policies for Gwangju was also set forth in
“C-Korea 2010,” a white paper published in 2005 by the Ministry of Culture and Tourism. The
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white paper describes the “C-Korea 2010” vision of a so-called “creative” or cultural national
economy. It specifies encouraging foreign exports of Korean music, drama, and film, promoting
Korean entertainers in the Asian entertainment market, and installing international trade fairs or
film and leisure-sports festivals in major cities that are designated as international cities of
culture or tourism. This white paper has the ambitious goal of placing regional and local cities in
the first-tier of the global cultural/creative industry, along with the rapid incorporation of
national and local development into the global economic system. To realize the state’s vision of
“development” through the economization of culture, the C-Korea 2010 concretely suggests ten
major policy goals and, among them, the “Cities of Culture” Project (Chapter 7), and the
“Establishing Gwangju as the Cultural Capital of Asia” (pp. 62–63) is specified as a primary goal
for realizing national cultural policy goals.
While the regeneration of Gwangju aims at reducing Cholla Province’s exclusion from
the country’s economic growth, the reduction of culture into industry has dominated the
government’s cultural policy: For urban regeneration in Gwangju, the government has launched
enormous state projects such as establishment of the Cultural Hall of Asia (through the
investment of $2 billion: $1billion from national funding, $50 million from local funding, and
$50 million from private capital) and of a Multi-Complex for the Culture Industry ($53 million)
— all to meet the government’s goal of making Gwangju the capital of the culture industry. The
state-sponsored market initiatives relating to culture and the arts have been the main driver for
the renewal of Gwangju. Local policymakers have launched initiatives such as hosting
international arts biennales and culture festivals and promoting tourism to supplement the
powerful drive of the central government to promote local growth through the culture industry.
The national and local governments are busily calculating the synergistic effects of these efforts,
such as creating new employment and increasing market profits from the huge investment in the
“city of culture” project. In response to the central government’s investment plan, the local
government has also suggested their own vision, the so-called “Gwangju Vision 2010.” The local
government’s “Five-year Plan for the Creation of a First-Class Gwangju” corresponds exactly to
the central government’s investment plan. The city government’s first goal is “to create an
affluent city by attaining an average per capita income of $14,000” through the “power of
culture” (Planning & Management Office of Gwangju City 2005). Stimulated by the central
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government’s investment, the city government has poured frenzied effort into only two goals for
the city: tourism and the industrialization of culture.
In a social climate dominated by the central and local government’s logic of economic
development through the culture industry and competition in the global economy, the historical
memory of the 1980 uprising in Gwangju has either been effaced or converted into the
“memorial industry.” In general, during the implementation period of cultural policy from 1993
to the present, the establishment of a cultural identity in Korea has been evaluated by the
economic value of the cultural industries (Yim 2002). In fact, the original rhetoric of “the city of
culture” was questionable from the beginning, when the government, seeking economic
expansion and an international profile for the city, applied a concept derived from European
experience.
The Mirage of the “City of Culture” in Gwangju
The state-generated rhetoric aimed at persuading the people of the advantages of the “city
of culture” project is part of a larger effort throughout the last decade to accelerate the economic
and cultural globalization of South Korea. The rhetoric of a “New Korea” began gradually
increasing under the Young-sam Kim government (1993–1997). Kim was the first president to
popularize the discourses of “internationalization” and “globalization.” The motto of “New
Korea” aimed to persuade people to voluntarily adopt “a market liberalization policy that was
required by the ‘globalization’ of capital in order to become a member of the Organization for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)” (Kang 2000, p. 451).
Since becoming a member country of the OECD, the Korean government has been
rapidly incorporated into the worldwide intellectual property (IP) system that aims to monopolize
the new immaterial resources in the new paradigm of the “knowledge-based society” (or
“creative society”) by means of international IP institutions. Consequently, South Korea became
a party to the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) in 1995, the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary
and Artistic Works in 1996, and the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) Copyright
Treaty in March 2004. Between 1957, when the Copyright Act was first enacted in South Korea,
and 2004, the Act was revised eleven times—with three such revisions occurring since the year
2000. The trajectory of the Act’s revisions can be summarized in one phrase: “the reinforcement

Urban Regeneration in Gwangju, Korea 12

of intellectual property rights” (Hong 2005). The wholesale subordination of the Korean
government to the international IP system coincides with a shift in policy interest from
industrialization to the commercialization of cultural expression.
The rapid affiliation of Korean society with cultural globalization was simultaneous with
the government’s active interventionist policy for redefining the development of local cities.
Historically, the initiative for “the city of culture” policy in Korea derived from the “European
cities of culture” program originated by the Greek Minister of Culture, Melina Mercuri, in 1985.
The European Commission’s motto is to promote cultural “imagination, innovation, and
creativity” in European cities, and it designates a new “city of culture” every year with the goal
of achieving a platform for European networks of artists and institutions. The name was changed
to the “European Capital of Culture” program in 1999, at which time a new selection procedures
were adopted to avoid “overly fierce competition to win the accolade”; the EU’s own study saw
a need to place “increased emphasis on the cultural and European components” in the selection
process and recommended further changes (Wikipedia 2005a). An “American Capital of
Culture” program was established by the Organization of American States (OAS), and since
2000 the so-called “American Capital of Culture Organization” has awarded the title to one or
more North or South American cities annually. This program also aroused criticism, in this case
because cities were asked to donate money in order to receive the “honor” (Wikipedia 2005b).
Ignoring such questions surrounding the “city of culture” programs in Europe and
America, the Korean government launched a similar program as part of its urban regeneration
policy. Through a revision of the Act for Urban Planning in 2001, the Minister of Construction
and Transportation designated some cities as “model cities” in order to promote them for global
tourism, a policy dominated by the logic of economic development, just as the “cities of culture”
policy has been. The shift of terminology to “the city of culture” was made when the concrete
experiment of government investment in Gwangju was launched. Garnham (2005, p. 16)
describes the “reinforcement of economic language and patterns” within recent policy rhetoric in
England; similarly, in Korea the shift to the rhetoric of “cities of culture” implies a move from
marketing and promoting tourism through the idea of “model cities” to the commercialization of
cultural assets and identities in the “cities of culture.” In a Korea desiring to accomplish in a
compressed time-frame the creation of a modernity resembling that of wealthier Western
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societies, the element of indigenous cultural identity is always viewed from within a business
perspective of “development” and “competition.”
In sum, the “city of culture” project in Gwangju is a mixture of the neoliberal policy
approach to culture as an industry and the Korean government’s attempt to consign historical
memory to oblivion rather than promoting its spirit. The civilian governments’ cultural policies
have functioned as a political gesture to “buy off” the local residents; rather than curing the
unhealed memory of the city, they have minimized the historic value of the political uprising and
human rights. It is no surprise, then, that the policy initiatives for Gwangju manifest such
undemocratic characteristics as elite-led exhibitionism of urban regeneration, the top-down
policy-making process, and the market-driven designs of cultural policy.
Regenerating Gwangju as the City of Human Rights
Looking at the official website of the City of Gwangju, a visitor sees the five catchphrases of “the 21st Century Gwangju Vision”: the “city as an international hub,” the “high-tech
information city,” the “city of culture and art,” the “ecological city,” and “the city of humanism
and democracy.” The image of a city that defended peace, human values, and democracy now
functions as an ancillary ornament to a top-down policy goal of urban regeneration through the
economic reductionism of culture, rather than as “a vehicle for local representation and
empowerment” (García 2004, p. 103). The “city of culture” project in Gwangju was born out of a
confluence of various factors: the current Noh administration’s desire to salve the old wounds of
the 5/18 uprising (the political factor), a desire to overcome regional separatism and economic
unevenness (the social factor), and a desire to reconfigure local culture and the arts as economic
motors within the international market (the economic factor). These top-down and businessdriven policy decisions have made it impossible to hear the real voices of the citizens of
Gwangju (the logic of exclusion) and to sustain the historical memory of the 5/18 uprising in the
face of the rhetorical onslaught of cultural globalization (the logic of oblivion).
In the “Symposium on the 20th Anniversary of the Gwangju Uprising,” the critical
scholar Katsiaficas (2000a; 2000b) evaluated the significance of the 1980 uprising in Gwangju as
comparable to that of the Paris Commune in French history and of the battleship Potemkin in
Russian history. Gwangju’s historical significance, he argued, has three dimensions: that of “the
capacity of self-government,” of “the organic solidarity of the citizens,” and of “the international
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significance of the uprising.” These three dimensions suggest how the democratic heritage of
Gwangju should be cultivated through the government’s urban policy. The first and second
dimensions that Katsiaficas saw in the 1980 uprising, the historical value of “self-government”
and “solidarity,” should be reflected in the current cultural policies of the national and local
governments. Currently, public input from below into the huge urban project is almost
nonexistent: most programs have been implemented from top by elites who enjoy exhibiting
their performances through constructing a monstrous cultural center or theme park, rather than
encouraging the spiritual values of a “soft” and “immaterial” heritage through cultural
participation from below. Katsiaficas’ third dimension — “the international significance of the
uprising” — is the most important aspect of Gwangju in a global society. Rather than sanitizing
the memory of the 5/18 uprising, the cultural policy needed is one that will regenerate the city as
an Asian hub for human rights and democracy in order to renew the heritage of the uprising for
the present day.
A cultural policy aimed at creating a “city of human rights” is not antithetical to the
economic growth principle of local cities. If the local government allows the active participation
of the citizens in the decision-making process of cultural projects in the city and if its current
activities such as sponsoring international festivals, conferences, and art biennales are continued
on the more democratic basis of encouraging a real sense of historical memory, Gwangju could
rebuild its image as the preserver of a heritage of pro-democratic political resistance—an image
that is not enhanced by building larger, prettier cemeteries or by sanitizing the sites of the
military terror that was perpetrated there.
Current urban policy in Gwangju, however, has been greatly conditioned by corporate
culture, which ignores the importance of social inclusion and the civic participation of
marginalized community groups that should lie at the heart of urban regeneration. Although
development of the local economy is central to such a policy agenda, urban policy needs to
promote the spiritual value of an historic heritage while simultaneously promoting the active
involvement of underserved and underprivileged local communities. As Mercer (2000) argues,
integrating sustainable urban development with the concept of “cultural citizenship” enables
local and regional communities to be defined by the “texture, quality and diversity of the new
city” (p. 11). UNESCO’s (2005) initiative also situates within local and regional development
the concerns of “sustainable” development, which aims to promote democratic values such as the
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diversity of cultural expressions, respect for all cultures, human rights, and the relative
independence of culture from the industrial approach. Cultural policy programs for sustainable
development in Gwangju should construct a collaborative network with the initiatives of
international bodies such as UNESCO, which would perform such roles as cross-national
mediator, joint funding coordinator, or supporter of cultural research networks. Gwangju’s
involvement in international initiatives will be a positive step toward protecting its rich cultural
heritage from the neoliberal attack of market-driven policies.

NOTE
1

The role of the US in crushing the Gwangju uprising has never been officially clarified. Since the US government had final

authority over the US-Korean Allied Forces Command, and thus the Korean government would have had to obtain official
permission from the US in order to move infantry divisions, airborne units, and special task forces into Gwangju, most Koreans
believe the US government was indirectly involved in the Gwangju massacre.
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